The primary purpose of unemployment insurance (U.I.) is no doubt to insure individuals against the loss of wage income. However, U.I. is commonly believed to lengthen the duration of unemployment because of its effect on the effort devoted to job search and on the minimum acceptable wage offer, the "reservation wage." Of course, if the government monitored job search behavior, no such problem woulcl exist: U.I. benefits could be withheld if effort or the reservation wage was unsatisfactory. But because it is not easy to do, monitoring of job search behavior is in fact limited.
With these issues in mind, this paper asks how U.I. benefits ought to be paid over time.' Specifically, the paper asks how to pay benefits over tirne so as to maximize the expected utility of the unemployed, subject to two constraints. The first is that the unemployed act in a self-interested way, given the U.I. program. And the second is that the total size of the U.I. budget is taken as fixed (see Baily [I9771 for a discussion of the detern~iilation of the correct size of the budget). T h e paper does not inquire into how individuals become unemployed and consequently is not concerned ~vith the effect of U.I. on layoff and quit behavior (see Feldstein 1974 (see Feldstein , 1976 .
T h e problenl is initially studied under the assunlption that unemployed individuals have no wealth and cannot borrow. This seems to be a reasonable approximation of reality for some but certainly not for all of the unen~ployed. Under this assumption (1) if it is supposed that individuals have no influence over the probability of getting ajob (a case which we think it instructive to consider), then the optimal time sequence of beilefits is a constant sequence. This is as expected, since a constant sequence equates the marginal utility of benefits in the different periods. However, (2) if it is assumed that individuals do have an influence over the probability of getting a j o b a n d that the government does not monitor individual behavior-then the optimal time sequence declines antl, although al~vays remaining positive, tends to zero. A declining sequence is desirable (inclividuals are induced to get jobs sooner, at least on average) even though it reduces the role of benefits as insurance (individuals who have the bad luck to remain unemployed a long time collect lower benefits). This result is illustrated by computing the optimal time path of benefits using estimates from other studies of the effect of unemployment insurance on the duration of unemployment. (If it is instead assumed that the government monitors irldiviclual behavior, then because there is no problem of adverse incentives, the optinial time sequence of benefits is a constant sequence.)
The problem is then examined under the assumption that unemployeci individuals begin their spell of unemployment with positive wealth--or, equivalently, that they may borrow-ancl may save or dissave. Under this assumption, (3) if it is supposed that itldivicluals have no influence over the probability of getting a job, then the optimal time sequence of benefits starts at zero ancl then jumps to a positive and constant level. This is because benefits ought to be given when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently high, which is ~vhen ' A recent paper b, Rlortrnsen (1977) is of related interest. He asks howjob search 1)ehavior of the ullemployed responds to changes in the benefit rate ancl the length of the benefit prriod assurr~ing that benefits are paicl out in the usual u.a\-at a constant rate over the benefit period.
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individuals have been unemployed long enough to have sufficiently depleted their wealth. However (4)if it is assumed that individuals do have an influence on the probability of getting a job, it is suggested that the optimal time sequence may rise and then fall, reflecting results 3 and 2. Although this case proved analytically intractable, the optimal solution to a two-period version of the model was calculated. The complicated nature of that solution indicates that no simple general qualitative results are possible-the solution depends on the magnitudes of conflicting (but intuitively plausible) forces.
I. The Model
The formal problem is to pay benefits over time so as to maxin>ize the exp~cted utilitj of newly urtemplojed individuals subject to the co?zstraints that individual,^ act i n a self--interested ioa?, given the presence of U.I., and that p x p f~t~( 1 As noted earlier, it will not (larourztrdprl-mpitcr De,~ejt,s n r~j i x~t l . be asked why individuals become unemployed. However individuals become unemployed, and whatever the size of the U.I. budget, certainly the budget should be used in a manner which maximizes expected utility ."
The individuals in the model are assumed to be identical and risk averse. They are assumed to be unable to borrow in the case when they begin their 'spells of unemployment ~vithout ~v e a l t h q u t to be able to borrow, save, and dissave in the other case.
During each period, it is assumed that an unemployed indiviclual first collects U.I. benefits and then either finds a job or does not. If he finds a job in period t , it is assumed that he is first paid in period t + 1 and, for convenience, that he works at the job f o r e~e r .~ "ilthough there is no inquir) about ho\v individualu become unemploj-etl, it is assutnetl that the levcl of the U.I. budget is not "too high" (other\visr quits and layoffs \~o u l d he excessive). Specifically, it is assurlled in propositions I atitl 111 that the level of the budget is not high enough so that the full wage z i could be paitl each period. Yet it sho~tltl be adrliittetl that the design of. the time uecluence of herletits hich maximizes expectecl utilit! Inay not Ile entirel\ irldepelldent of the factol-s pertinent to how indi\icl~c;tls becorne unenlploveti and thr level of thc U.1, budget. Supposr, e.g., that a fir~n's cont1.ihrction to the U.I. fund does not ~L I I I \reflect the benefits paid to the etl~ployccs it I&\\ c)ff. Theti, a time sequence of benefits th,tt pr-ovides a "high" itlitial levcl of' hcnefits [night irltluc-e the firin to increase the ntlrnber of tetnporar) la)offs. Such a po\\ibilit! is not yaken into account irl the s~cbseclucnt analvsis.
:' Needless to sa). this assumption is ofien realistic; for reasons of moral hazard, unemployed indivitluals frequentlv find it clifficul~ to borro~r-.
Allo~ving for the possibility that intlividuals who get jobs might later become unemploved \\.oulcl not change either the results or the proofs (since the only effect would be to change b\ a constarit the "value of the optimal continuation" given that a job is found), but it r\.ould incl-case the notational burtien on the reader. Also, alloxving for the porsihilit\ t h a~\ v o r l in\-olves disutilit) ~vould not change eitherthe results (except that the constant b in propositio~l111 ~~~o u l d have to be less than 718) or their proofs.
The probability of finding a job in each period is either taken to be exogenous or to depend on individual behavior. When the former assumption is made, it is not because we think it necessarily describes an empirically important situation but rather because we think it is informative to determine how benefits ought to be paid if their only role is as insurance, thus ignoring any adverse incentive effects. When the latter assun~ption is made, individuals are assumed to look over job offers and to accept any one with a !$age as high as the reserz~atzon wage. The choice of the reservation wage is made each period and depends on the time sequence of future U.I. benefits and the probability distribution of wage offers. This distribution is assumed to be influenced b) the effort devoted to job search. Such effort (which ma) be interpreted as a subtraction from leisure) is assumed to i~lvolve disutility. The probability distribution of wage offers as a function of effort is assumed to be known and, for simplicity, fixed from period to period.
T h e follo~ving terrns are used in the next section.
U ( . )= strictly concave increasing function giving the utility of consurnption each period, b, = unemployment insurance benefit paid at the beginning of the tth successive period of unemployment, pt = probability of finding a job in period t , et = effort (measured in utility cost) devoted to job search in period t , w , = wage offer in period t , W* --reservation wage in period t , f ( w , , e,) = probability density of a ivage offer given effort, r = one-period discount rate (assumed to be equal to the interest rate).
Let B, > 0 be the expected discounted amount that the government has in the U.I. fund per unemployed inclividaal. Thus B, satisfies
Note that
is the probability of being unemployed at the beginning of period t . More generally, let so that B , is expected benefits, discounted to t , which are paid to an individual from t onward, given that he is unemployed at i.
The Optimal Time Sequence of Benefits Assuming That the Unemployed Have No Wealth and Cannot Borrows
In this case, an individual who is unemployed at the beginning of period t receives and consumes b,, enjoying utility from consumption of U (b,) . Suppose first that the probabilities are fixed. Thus, the role of effort ~vill not be considered, and it tvill be assumed that the wage of any job which might be found is known with certaintj to be zu. Thus, the \ alue, discounted to t, of being paid for a job beginning in t is U (w )
The tth term in E U , gives the contribution to discounted expected utility if a job is found in period t. The first factor in the tth term is the probability of finding a job in period t. The second is the discounted utility if that happens, which is comprised of the utility from t periods of U.I. benefits plus that from wages earned later. The probability of never finding a job is zero.Wore generally, define so that EUt is expected utility, discounted to i, given that an individual is unemployed at t. Note that It can be shown that the results in this case hold as well when unemployed individuals have some constant, exogenous source of income-for example, a working spouse. This is true if it is assumed that the probability of getting slob is bounded away from zero.
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The problem is to maximize E U , over sequences {b,): subject to the conrtraint that B , is a constant. It will, however, be convenient to treat the equivalent problem, minimize B , over sequences {b,}:, subject to the constraint that E U , is a constant. It is clear that a necessary condition for optimality of {bt); for this equivalent problem is that for any t , EL', should be attained at least cost, that is, B, should be minimized, given that EU, equals a constant, say ET,.Thus, it must be true in particular that B , is minimized over just bt and bt+, subject to the constraint EU, = m t . This necessary condition is used in the proof of the next proposition, which is presented along with the other proofs in the Appendix. 
This is true for familiar reasons: Suppose that b, < b,,, for some t (the case b, > bt+, is analogous) and consider a small reduction in b,,, and a small increase in b, which are actuarially fair (i.e., calculated to
change will increase expected utility.
Consider now the situation when unemployed individuals do influence the probability of getting a job by their choice of effort and the reservation wage. In this situation an individual who is unemployed at the beginning of period t and receives b, enjoys U(b,) -el,as effort in t involves disutility el. The marginal utilities of effort and consumption are taken as independent. This assumption is necessary to our results. The probability of getting a job as a function of effort and the reservation wage is (6) Let u t be the value of expected utility, discounted to t + 1, given that an individual gets a job in period t , ' Suppose that this were not true. That is, suppose that cr = { b t ) y is optimal and yet for some t , say T,E U , could be achieved by P = {b,*}F, where the discounted cost of this sequence is less thanB,. Then it is easy to check that the sequence y = {b,, bz, . . . ,b~-, , b*, b h , , . . .} has a discounted cost less thanB, and that discounted expected utility is the same as with a.
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Suppose that at time t an unemployed individual has selected {ej)T and {w?),", implying {p,);" and {uj)F. Conditional upon being unemployed at this time, his expected utility, discounted to t , is
The interpretation of the terms in Et is similar to that of the terms in EU,.
Assume that the government does not observe effort or the reservation wage, so that individuals treat the b, as fixed. Then E,+, must satisfy the following equation (the "principle of optimality"):
u y , r ,
t ) E t + l ) .
The first-order conditions for selection of urt and e, are Thus, This is, of course, explained by the envelope theorem. Also, differentiation of (10) and use of the second-order conditions giveB Differentiating (10) with respect to Et+, and solving for drr~*/dE,+, and deIdE,,,, we obtain dw*
whereH is the Hessian from (9) and is negative definite (the second-order condition for since H-I is negative definite, being the inverse of a negative-definite matrix.
--
In other words, anything which increases the utility of being unemployed in t + 1 increases the probability of that event. Now by the logic used in regard to proposition I, a necessary condition for optimality of {b,): is that for any t , Bt should be minimized over-just bt and b,,,, subject to the constraint that E, equals a constant E,. This necessary condition and (9)- (12) The idea behind the proof of iii is straightforward. Suppose that b, = b,,, and consider a small actuarially fair reduction in bt+l and increase in b f . Since initially U 1 ( b t )= LTf(bt+,),the first-order approximation of the direct effect of this change on expected utility will be zero. And, by the envelope theorem, the indirect effect on expected utility of this change through an altered level of effort or the reservation wage can be ignored. But E,+, will be lo~vered, and thus by (12)P, and ul,*will change so as to raise the probability of getting a job in period t. Since the probability of getting a job in periods other than the tth will be unaffected, the increased probability of success in period t will lower the expected cost of providing benefits. A similar argument rules out the case b, < !I,+,.
T h e result iv is analogous to the ~vell-known fact that, for singleperiod models of insurance and moral hazard, if the insurer can monitor the behavior of insureds then the optimal insurance policy is of the same character as that when the probability distribution of loss is exogenous.
Part iii of the proposition may be illustrated by finding the least-cost time sequence of benefits which achieves the same expected utility that a newly unemployed individual enjoys under the current U.I. system. (The sequence we seek is, of course, also the one which maximizes expected utility, given the least-cost level of benefits.) In the calculations which are discussed in the Appendix, it is assumed that U is logarithmic. T h e results are shown in table 1.
T h e average cost to the government under the optimal sequence .36 weeks' (5.6 weeks average duration x 0.6 weeks benefit level) salary currently paid to unemployed workers. T h e savings comes about because beyond ~veek 6 unemployment benefits are less than 60 percent of take-home pa);. \.l'orkers are, rlonetheless, ,just as well off because they are induced to get jobs sonlewhat earlier-average duration falls about 1 percent-and, if the); find a ,job anytime before week 11, receive more benefits in total than under the present scheme.
The Optimal Time Sequence of Benefits Assuming That the Unemployed Begin with Positive Wealth or Can Borrow
In this case, indivicluals are assumed to begin their spell of unemployment with positive ~vealth; or, equivalently, they are assunled to be able to borrow u p to some positive amount against future income. Additionally, individuals are assumed to be able to save or dissave. Let c r 2 0 and c: 2 0 be consumption during period t if the individual is, respectively, unemployed or employed at the beginning of the period.
Let z,be wealth exclusive of any benefits or wages at the beginning of the period. Then if, for example, the individual bvas not employed at the beginning of period t , clearl! zt+, 5 ( 2 , + h, -ry)(l + r). Consumption is assumecl to be feasible, that is, cy 5 z, + b, and cf 5 z, + illr.
Suppose first that the probabilities p, are exogenously cleterrllined and, thus (as in the previous case), that effort is ignored a11d that the wage if a j o b is found is k n o~\~n with certainty. Let J ( z ) be the to be zu discounted utility of an individual, given that he has just found a job last period and has wealth z . Suppose that at time t an unemployed individual has optimally selected {c)l);. Conditional upon being unemployed at this time, his expected utility, discounted to t , is T h e quantity V , depends on wealth at the beginning of period t , so that it will usually be written V, (z,) .Note that V t (.) and V,+,( . ) must satisfy
T h e problem to be solved is to maximize discounted expected utility, V,(zl),subject to the constraint that B , is a constant. T h e intuition behind the result is that when an individual is first unemployed he has relatively high wealth and consumes relatively much, meaning that the marginal utility of U.I. benefits is lo\+, compared with what it is later, when he has reduced his savings. This suggests that U.I. benefits should not be given until wealth has fallen to a critical level-until the marginal utility of wealth has risen to a critical level-and then that positive benefits should be given. Arid orice positive benefits are given, they shoulcl be constant by much the same argument given for proposition I. I t should also be mentioned that if initial wealth z, is sufficiently low, positive U.I. benefits should -be given at the outset (T = 0) and that b < w ;otherwise b = w .
We have not been able to characterize the optimal time sequence of U.I. benefits \\.hen unemployed individuals begin with positive wealth, when they influence the probability of getting a job by their choice of effort and the reservation wage, and when the government does not riionitor these variables. But the relevant considerations seerrl clear from the last two propositions. Proposition 111 illustrates that there is an advantage to having benefits increase because this enhances the role of U.I. as insurance for those who deplete their wealth as a consequence of being unemployed for long periods, whereas proposition I1 illustrates that there is an advantage to having benefits decline because this creates an additional incentive to get a job. 'The optimal time sequence of' benefits nlust reflect an implicit weighing of these t~v o advantages. Presumably, the latter advantage is the more important \\.hen ivealth is sufficiently low. At least this is the '357 case in the following example which shows for a two-period model how the optimal time sequence of U.I. benefits changes as initial wealth changes (but there are complicating factors). The results are displayed in table 2.
The example was numerically solved for each level of initial wealth. The wage was fixed at 100 and per capita expected discounted benefits R , \\.ere 7 5 ; also, p,(r,) = 1 -[101(10.3 + e t ) ] , and U ( c ) = 100(~/'100)~.~. Note that for very low levels of wealth benefits decline, for higher levels of wealth they rise, but for even higher levels of wealth they again decline. This last fact is no doubt due to the following effect. When wealth is very high, risk aversion is very low (assuming of course that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth). When risk aversion is very low, the optimal time sequence should tend toward what it would be for the risk-neutral case. But for the riskneutral case it is easy to show that it is optimal to give all the benefits in the first period. (This maximizes the incentive to find a job, and the risk that this imposes on those who are unemployed long periods is of no concern since they are risk neutral.)
When the unemployed begin with positive wealth and influence the probability of getting a job but the government does monitor individual behavior, the optimal time sequence of benefits is as described in proposition I11 (paralleling the case in Section 11). The proof is analogous to that given for proposition IIiv.
IV. Concluding Remarks
'This paper abstracted from a variety of considerations which are relevant to the determination of an optimal time sequence of U.I. benefits. Trvo such considerations seem particularly important, the first of which concerns the probability distribution of wage offers. As is well recognized in models of job search, the assumption that this distribution is fixed is not ahvays realistic. For example, when the labor market is "tight," an attempt to reduce the duration of unemployment by a change in the time sequence of benefits would lead to increased competition forjobs and would therefore probably be offset to some extent by an adverse shift in the schedule giving the probability of getting a job (as a function of effort and the reservation wage). On the other hand, when unemployment is in large part "search unemployment," ~vhen vacancies are high relative to unemployment, the assumptiorl that the'distribution of wage offers is fixed is probably closer to the truth. T h e second consideration concerns the assumption of this paper that nelvly unemployed individuals are identical. If this assumption were relaxed, two approaches to provision of U.I. ~voulcl have to be examined (supposing that the governnlent cannot easily detect individual differences and adjust benefits accordingly). A single time sequence of benefits could be used for all unelnployed individuals. Presumably, the clesign of such a time sequence would reflect the changing conlpositiorl of the unemployed by duration of unernployment-individuals who have been unemployed longer are Inore likely to have a lower probability of finding a job, other things equal. Alternatively, several time sequences of benefits could be offered and the newly unemployed allowed to select their most preferred sequence. But for this approach to be used to advantage different groups must be induced to select different sequences of benefit^.^
Appendix

Proof of Propotition 1
T h e Lagrangean for t h e problenl of lninimizing B, o v e r b, a n d bf+lsubject to
E.g., suppose that there are two different groups of unemployed, each beginning rvith no wealth and being unable to borrow. Assume that the duration of unemployment in the first group is short and is very sensitive to changes in the time sequence of benefits, while the opposite is true in the seco~ld. Assume that a choice is offered between two time sequences of benefits: the first begins at a high level and declines rapidly, the second at a lotver level but declines slowly. Then the first group might choose the first sequence and the second group the second sequence. This might be more desirable than offering one sequence, for the groups are induced to select the sequence which best meets their needs.
T h e fil st-order conditions are
(A31 Srnce (AS) reduces to 0 = I -A L"ib,,,), these conditions impk C"(b,) = CV(ht,,), so that b, = b,,,.
To prove iii, first note the follorving items: ( I ) dE,,,!db, = 0, (2) rlicl~idb,= 0, 
. dE,+lldh,+l 1 + r Using (As) to eliminate A, we get 0 = -(dp,ldb,+,)[bt+ll(l+ r ) Let I = lim b, (1 exists since b, is a decreasing and bounded sequence).
The first limit, say I,, is positive, and it rvill be assumed that the probability of getting a job is bounded away from 1, so that the second limit, I,, is also Suppose now that the government tells ir?ctividuals that bi = 0 unless el = i , , . . . , e, = ?t and TOT = GT, . . . , i l l ? = in which case b, = b,. That is, if in any period t an individual ever fails to choose i , and Gt*, he cannot collect bt nor any benefits in :he future. It thcn follows that an individual will always choose P, and $7 (otherlvise he would be better off not getting any benefits after sonle point, which can easily be shown to contradict the optimaljty of {b,);). Thus E l will in fact he achieved if the time sequence of benefits is {b,)?. Bur a necessary condition for selection of {b,};' was that it solved the problem of maximizing E l subject to B, = B, where the probabilities are fixed at the optimal levels l o Note that benefits tend to zero even though the possibility of infillire marginal utility of bvealrh at zero was not ruled out. However, benefits do remain positive, which agrees with the result in a single-period model of insurance that an optimal policy under moral hazard al~vays involves positive coverage (Shavell, forthcoming) . {pt)y (determined by p, = p[GL;T,?,I). And by the proof to proposition I, the solution to this problem involves a constant time sequence of benefits.
Proof of Proposition III
The argument, which is similar to that used in propositions I and 11, will only be sketched here. Assume that the optimal consumption c H does not exhaust wealth z,; that is, assume that c; is determined by setting equal to zero the derilative of (14) . . . Hence, the optimal future consumption stream is independent of whether an individual ever finds a job. It is, ag-n, easy to show that this can be true only if benefits equal the wage, that is, h = U I .
If initial wealth is sufficiently small, it might be the case that it would be optirnal to exhaust wealth. If so, the equality sign in (A13) is in general replaced by > ant1 an argument similar to that of the preceding paragraphs establishes the claim of the proposition, the only difference being that 8 < icl.
Cnlculutlor~ of the Optt,nal Tzme Sequence of CT.I. Bene$tc It is assumed that there is a reduced-form equation summarizing (10) which gives the probability of getting a job, p,, as a function of the difference between the value ut of getting a job and the value E,,, of continuing optimally if one is not found. Let p, = 1 -n exp [ -h (.u , -I?,,,) ].
(A171 Here, a and A are parameters which are to be determined froin data. For simplicit), several additional assulnptions are made: (1) All jobs pay a wage rlormalized at one in each period, so that u, = llr log 1 = 0; ( 2 )the discount rate is set at zero, as the period is taken to be 1 week and co~zlputations are made only for 50 weeks; (3) the current time sequence of benefits is characterized as remaining constant-at a level b,-rather than as terminating after sorne tirne. Under this assumption, the decision that an individual has to make is independent of how long he has been unemployed. Therefore, his level of effort P* and probability of finding a job p* will be the same each period. It ma). be assumed without loss of generality that the scale on which effbrt is measured is such that r* = 0. Then, b!. (8) If the average duration of unemplolmerlt is 5.6 weeks and U.1. benefits amount to about 60 percent of the wage (this is in rough accord with Feldstein [I9741 and Marston [1975] ), thenp* = 115.6 when h, = 0.6 and, from (A19), 115.6 = 1 -u exp (5.6 A log 0.6).
(A20) Most reported estimates of the elasticit! of expected duration of unemployment nith respect to U.I. benefits lie in the range from 0.105 to 0.29 (>farston 1975) ; to he conservative, it is assumed here to be 0.1. As we have = 0.1 = -rtA(5.6)' exp [A(5.6 log O.G)l.
(A221
p dbo
Equations (A20) anti (A22) imply that a is 0.826 and A is -0.00385. Using these values, the optimal sequence of benefits may be computed recursively.
(The initial benefits are chosen so that expected utility under the optimally declining sequence is exact11 that under the current scheme.)
